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ASSET PRESERVATION ORDERS BY THE
OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION
DwIGHT C. SMITH III* & JONATHAN H. TALcoTT**
Five years ago, Congress directed the federal banking agencies
to act promptly to ensure that the assets of suspected wrongdoers
are preserved to satisfy any judgment that ultimately may be is-
sued against them. The Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") has
used this authority in a responsible and effective manner, but it
has come under attack by groups such as the American Bar Asso-
ciation. There is no basis for this challenge. OTS's asset preser-
vation orders have been used in a measured fashion and are a use-
ful part of the agency's enforcement work.
I. STATUTORY AUTHORITY
One of the primary purposes of the Financial Institutions Re-
form, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA") was "to
strengthen the enforcement powers of Federal regulators of depos-
itory institutions."' The 1989 legislation included several provi-
sions to expand the enforcement authority of OTS and to enable
the agency to proceed promptly and effectively against those be-
lieved to have profited unjustly from abuses in the savings and
loan industry. Such reforms were necessary because "[l]ittle
doubt exist[ed] that fraud and insider abuse contributed substan-
tially to the [thrift] crisis."2 The Senate noted specifically the testi-
mony of one witness that "[a]t the very least, there was an enor-
mous failure of individuals to exercise their fiduciary
responsibilities."3
* Deputy Chief Counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision. B.A. 1977, J.D. 1981, Yale Univer-
sity. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
those of the Office of Thrift Supervision or the U.S. Government.
** Associate, Alston & Bird. Former Staff Attorney, Office of Thrift Supervision. B.A.
1984, University of North Carolina; J.D. 1989, University of Virginia.
1 Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 101(9), 103 Stat. 183 (1989); see also H.R. REP. No. 222, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 393 (1989) [hereinafter FIRREA CONFERENCE REPoirr.
2 S. REP. No. 19, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1989).
3 Id. at 9-10.
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Among the FIRREA reforms was the grant of authority to OTS
to issue temporary orders to preserve the assets of respondents in
enforcement proceedings whenever there might be a significant,
or non-minimal dissipation of assets.4 In short, whenever federal
regulators sought a significant recovery from a respondent, they
had the power to step in and prevent the respondent from dis-
sipating his assets. Such orders could be entered whenever a
prima facie case for restitution exists.
In Spiegel v. Ryan,5 the first case where the agency used this
authority, a federal district court held that a phrase added to sec-
tion 8(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act ("FDIA")6 by FIR-
REA that was intended to emphasize the importance of temporary
cease and desist orders as a means of enforcing growth limita-
tions, implied that such orders could be used only for such pur-
pose.7 The pertinent phrase in section 8(c) was "[s]uch order may
include any requirement authorized under subsection (b)(6)(B)."
Nothing in the legislative history indicates that this phrase was
intended to be an exclusive statement of the scope of temporary
cease and desist orders.'
Congress promptly undertook to correct the district court's mis-
apprehension. The Comprehensive Thrift and Bank Fraud Prose-
cution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 1990 (the "Comprehensive
Act")9 clarified the authority of federal banking agencies to issue
temporary orders to preserve the assets of respondents in enforce-
ment proceedings. Senate Banking Committee Chairman Donald
Riegle explained that the amendment made explicit the types of
relief available under temporary cease and desist orders: "The Of-
4 See Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 902(a)(2), 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (amending 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(c)(1)); see also FIRREA CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 439. In 1993, Con-
gress amended this authority to require that Rule 65 preliminary injunct showings of like-
lihood of success, balance of harms, and the public interest, although no showing of irrepa-
rable injury is required. See Resolution Trust Corporation Completion Act, Pub. L. No.
103-204, § 25(b), 107 Stat. 2409 (1993). This article was prepared as part of the public
dialogue on asset preservation orders before this amendment; and we accordingly do not
address its provisions here. The OTS orders that are the subject of this article were issued
under FIRREA authority and before enactment of RTC Completion Act.
5 Nos. 90-3520,90-3720, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14968 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 1990), rev'd, 946
F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1584 (1992) (emphasis added).
6 See Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 8(c), 105 Stat. 2348 (1991) (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C.
§ 1811 et seq.).
7 Spiegel, 946 F.2d at 1437.
8 See id. at 1438-39. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court decision, and held that
the district court had given an inappropriately narrow construction to the 1989 FIRREA
statute. Id. at 1437.
9 See Pub. L. 101-647, § 2521, 104 Stat. 4859 (1990).
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fice of Thrift Supervision has requested this technical change be-
cause of some differing applications of the current statutes by
some district courts. These changes are consistent with the con-
gressional intent at the time FIRREA was enacted and are to clar-
ify any ambiguity."'0
Congressman Charles Schumer made the same point:
[Ilt was never Congress' intention to limit temporary C&Ds to
only growth restrictions, which would have substantially re-
duced the scope of temporary C&Ds. (At every juncture, Con-
gress expanded the banking agencies' powers in the Financial
Institution Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act and the
legislative history bears this out.). Accordingly, this subsec-
tion clarifies the banking agencies temporary C&D authority,
to conform with congressional intent in passing the Financial
Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act."
In addition, in the same 1990 statute, Congress authorized the
federal courts, on application of a federal banking agency, to limit
a respondent's use of his assets and to appoint a receiver to ad-
minister the assets of a respondent.' 2 In order to obtain such an
order, an agency must make a prima facie showing of the respon-
dent's wrongdoing.' 3
Congress provided that the terms of Rule 65 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 which apply to preliminary injunc-
tions, would not apply to judicial proceedings for asset preserva-
tion orders.' 5 The legislative history explains: "Congress is grant-
ing such relief from the more rigorous requirements of Rule 65
because the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Reso-
lution Trust Corporation ("RTC") are in the position of protecting
the depository insurance fund, i.e., the taxpayers' money."' 6
Issuance of an asset preservation order does not depend on
whether the depository institution affected by the suspected
10 136 CONG. REc. S17599 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Senate Banking Com-
mittee Chairman Donald Riegle supporting "A Bill to Control Crime") (emphasis added).
11 136 CONG. REC. E3691 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990) (statement of Representative Charles
E. Schumer of New York on "Banking Law Enforcement").
12 Pub. L. 101-647, § 2521, 104 Stat. 4859 (1990).
13 See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(4)(B) (1992).
14 FED. R. Civ. P. 65.
15 See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(4)(B) (1992) (orders "shall be granted without bond upon a
prima facie showing").
16 136 CONG. REc. E3689 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990) (statement of Representative Charles
E. Schumer). The Congress since has taken a different position. See supra note 4.
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wrongdoing is open or closed. The statute authorizes temporary
orders upon an agency determination that the order will prevent
prejudice to the interests of depositors. 17 When an institution has
failed, the FDIC or the RTC succeeds to the depositors' interests,
and the OTS owes a fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the
insurers.' 8 The courts have sustained OTS's use of its authority
without regard to the open or closed status of the institution
involved.19
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ASSET PRESERVATION AUTHORITY
Since the enactment of FIRREA, OTS has issued a total of
thirty-one temporary cease and desist orders under its section
1818(c)(1) authority in order to preserve a respondent's assets.20
Twenty-two of the orders imposed comprehensive constraints on
an individual's use of his or her assets. Six orders were issued to
savings associations or their holding companies to prevent certain
asset transfers by those institutions. The remaining three orders
were against individuals but either limited withdrawals only from
certain accounts2 or prohibited only transfers of funds outside the
United States.22
17 See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(1) (1992).
18 Cf Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435, 1438 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing "OTS' compelling
point that restitution may not only compensate an institution for past wrongs, but may also
serve to prevent dissipation of assets that may belong to it, and thereby prevent prejudice
to its depositors").
19 See Parker v. Ryan, 959 F.2d 579, 579 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding OTS's order in pro-
ceeding involving closed institution).
20 See Robert Cooper, The Office of Thrift Supervision, 59 FORDHAm L. REv. 363, 371-72
(1991) (noting that OTS has authority to issue temporary cease and desist orders); Peter P.
Swire, Bank Insolvency Law Now That It Matters Again, 42 DuKE L.J. 469, 487 (1992).
Government agencies, such as OTS, have a wide range of authority, including the power to
issue temporary cease and desist orders to preserve an institution's assets. Id.; see also
Parker v. Ryan, 959 F.2d 579, 580 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The OTS has authority to pursue pro-
ceedings against an institution when it determines that the institution . . . is about to
engage in unsound business practices or is violating or about to violate the law."); In re
Paul, 763 F. Supp. 568 (S.D. Fla. 1990); In re Spiegel, OTS AP No. 92-64 (June 30, 1992).
Proceedings in these two matters have produced several additional orders; these orders are
not included in the thirty-one.
See Cooper, supra, at 371-72. Cooper has argued FIRREA has reduced the burden of
proof required to issue this order thus enhancing OTS's power in this area. Id. Thus, in-
stead of requiring a standard of likeliness of insolvency, substantial dissipation of assets, or
likeliness of seriously weakening the condition of the thrift, the new standard requires a
finding that the "unsafe or unsound practice was likely to cause a significant dissipation of
assets." Id. at 372; see also Raymund G. Kuwasaki, Liability of Attorneys, Accountants,
Appraisers, and Other Independent Contractors Under the Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 42 HASTNGS L.J. 249, 261 (1990).
21 See Moskowitz & Rudd, OTS AP No. ERC-90-46 (June 5, 1990) (resolution).
22 See Cone, OTS AP No. 92-43 (April 24, 1992); Motohari, OTS AP No. 92-44 (Apr. 24,
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Two-thirds or fifteen of the comprehensive asset orders have
been challenged in court. In all of these fifteen cases, the court has
upheld or followed the agency's exercise of its discretion.2 3 More
specifically, each occasion on which a federal court of appeals has
been asked to render a final decision on an asset preservation or-
der, the court has approved imposition of an order or declined the
opportunity to disapprove it. 2
4
At the district court level, with the exception of Landmark Land
Co. v. OTS, 25 the courts have either upheld the OTS's orders26 or
substituted their own order, which achieves substantially the
same goal.27
The issuance of temporary cease and desist orders that restrict
a respondent's use of assets is not routine. The twenty-two asset
preservation orders that have been issued to restrict use of an in-
dividual respondent's assets pending the outcome of enforcement
proceedings arose out of cases involving eighteen institutions.
Over the same period of time (1990-1992), OTS has issued a total
of 754 final cease and desist orders and civil money penalties-the
kinds of enforcement actions where asset orders may be consid-
ered-involving several hundred savings associations. In 1992,
OTS issued seven asset preservation orders against individuals;
in the same year there were 326 cease and desist orders and civil
1992).
23 See Landmark Land Co. v. OTS, No. 91-3938 (E.D. La. 1991) (district court issued
preliminary injunction), rev'd, 990 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1993). The court of appeals reversed
the district court's decision on the ground that the district court failed to apply the neces-
sary criteria for a preliminary injunction. Id. The parties have since stipulated to the entry
of a temporary order that bars transfers of property with a value of $5,000 or more without
adequate consideration. Id.; Landmark Land Co., OTS AP No. 93-51 (June 25, 1993)
(order).
24 See Parker v. Ryan, 959 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1992); Feitt v. OTS, 950 F.2d 721 (3d Cir.
1991); Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991); Paul v. OTS, 763 F. Supp. 568 (S.D.
Fla. 1990), affd per curiam, 948 F.2d 1297 (11th Cir. 1991); see also OTS v. Lopez, 960 F.2d
958 (11th Cir. 1992) (recognizing validity of preliminary injunction sought to preserve as-
sets in civil money penalty context).
25 990 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1993). But see Cone v. OTS, No. 92-1506 (E.D. La. May 8, 1992).
Despite the injunction ordered by the district court in Landmark, the same court upheld an
asset preservation order that OTS entered against different respondents in a proceeding
involving the same thrift institution.
26 See di Stefano v. OTS, 787 F. Supp. 292, 294 (D.R.I. 1992); Ryan v. Bonar, No. 92-C-
6077 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 24, 1992); Cone v. OTS, No. 92-1506 (E.D. La. May 8, 1992); Kim v.
Ryan, No. 91-6422 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 1992); Gladstone v. Ryan, No. 91-12695-H (D. Mass.
Nov. 25, 1991).
27 Three of these cases were in the same judicial district. See DiFabio v. Ryan, No. 292-
CV-581 (D. Conn. July 28, 1992); OTS v. Plaxe, No. 91-669 (D. N.J. Mar. 1, 1991); Hart-
mann v. OTS, No. 91-CV-00166 (D. N.J. Va. Nov. 20, 1991); Moskowitz v. Ryan, No. 90-
2114 (D. N.J. Oct. 24, 1990).
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money penalties. Clearly, OTS issues asset preservation orders
sparingly.
The purpose of an asset preservation order is to preserve those
assets against which the agency ultimately may have to execute a
judgment. The decision to issue a temporary order necessarily in-
volves predictive judgments, a matter on which administrative
agencies have broad discretion.2 Asset preservation orders pro-
vide respondents with an option to either post security in a speci-
fied amount,2 9 or seek OTS approval before making expenditures
above a certain amount ($5,000 or more)., 0 The security requested
is tied explicitly to the amount that the OTS believes to represent
a respondent's wrongful gain, or the loss to a savings association
caused by respondents' actions. The respondents are allowed to
continue their normal financial lives while otherwise preserving
their assets.3 '
If a respondent fails to post security, the OTS considers the re-
spondent's reasonable needs when limiting expenditures. A pres-
ervation order ordinarily provides that a respondent may continue
to make payments for living expenses and must seek OTS ap-
proval only for individual expenditures in excess of $5,000. The
asset preservation orders usually also request the submission of
financial information about the respondent, so that OTS can ap-
propriately assess respondent's reasonable needs.
Additionally, the preservation orders permit a respondent to ap-
ply to the Director for hardship relief. Upon such application, the
agency undertakes an intensive review of respondents' financial
condition and legitimate needs before limiting expenditures. For
example, in a case involving David Paul, the former chairman of
CenTrust Bank in Miami, Florida, OTS issued several orders over
a five-month period in 1991 in response to the hardship applica-
tions of Mr. Paul. OTS ultimately determined to limit Mr. Paul to
a monthly allowance of $7,00032 and appointed a receiver to ad-
28 See Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 87, 102 (1983).
29 See Paul v. OTS, 763 F. Supp. 568, 570 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (OTS granted temporary cease
and desist order requiring Paul to give security for the $30 million debt); see also Ryan v.
Bonar, No. 92-C-6077 (N.D. 111. Nov. 24, 1992) (temporary order required $8.6 million in
security and accounting of his finances and recent transfers of assets).
30 See Spiegel, OTS AP No. 92-64 (June 30, 1992) (order) (temporary order provided that
respondent give two business days notice of proposed expenditure of $5,000 or more).
31 See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
32 See FSLIC v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 556 (5th Cir. 1987) (allowing only $3500 monthly
allowance).
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minister his assets.3 3 He failed to comply with the order, and the
federal district court later issued a similar order designed to pre-
serve his assets.34
A similar series of orders were issued in connection with the
enforcement proceeding against Thomas Spiegel. After requesting
separate budget proposals from Mr. Spiegel and from the agency's
enforcement staff, the Director imposed a monthly budget of ap-
proximately $60,000 largely to enable Mr. Spiegel to make
monthly mortgage payments.35
The agency also has permitted, through its asset preservation
orders, expenditures to pay reasonable attorney's fees. However,
the agency has followed the decision of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida in Paul v. OTS,36 which
limited Mr. Paul's lawyers to a maximum hourly rate of $250 and
an overall rate of $200 an hour. The agency does not permit re-
spondents subject to asset preservation orders to pay attorneys in
advance, through retainers or other mechanisms, since the agency
will only authorize payments on a monthly basis subject to rate
limitations and on receipt of certain documentation. This ap-
proach has found judicial approval.37
In short, asset preservation orders serve "an important govern-
ment interest, which Congress identified as fighting insider abuse
of savings and loan institutions, as well as to protect the public
fisc, which, because of deposit insurance is obligated to make good
on most of the deposits in those institutions."3 8
III. DuE PROCESS
The principal constitutional issue surrounding asset preserva-
tion orders is whether they comport with due process. The two
33 See Paul, OTS AP No. 91-26 (June 1, 1991) (order).
34 See Paul v. OTS, No. 90-2496-Civ.-Davis (S.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 1991).
35 See Spiegel, OTS AP No. 92-64 (June 30, 1992) (order). The Director allowed the re-
spondent those expenses which did not "appear to perpetuate an extravagant lifestyle." Id.
at 5. For example, respondent was permitted to pay mortgage payments; office expenses;
general household expenses; and education expenses. Id. However, the Director deter-
mined that respondent's proposed monthly expenditures for food, clothing, and entertain-
ment, approximately $7,000, were "unreasonably high in view of the purpose of the asset
preservation order." Id.
36 No. 90-2496-Civ.-Davis (S.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 1991).
37 See Spiegel v. Ryan, No. 92-533-RMT (C.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 1992), affd, 995 F.2d 138
(9th Cir. 1993).
38 See Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435, 1440 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1584
(1992).
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courts of appeal to consider the issue have concluded that they
do.39 Due process jurisprudence fully supports this conclusion.
Due process requires only an opportunity to be heard in a mean-
ingful time and manner.40 All that the Supreme Court requires is
"some form of hearing... before an individual is finally deprived
of a property interest."4 1 An asset preservation order is not a final
deprivation of property because the property is not transferred to
the agency and the respondent has the right to a prompt adver-
sarial hearing.
Congress has authorized comparable asset preservation orders
under the Futures Trading Act.42 Under that Act, a district court
may issue an ex parte order that preserves assets subject to the
supervision of a temporary receiver. Congress's purpose in doing
so was to "prohibit movement or disposal of funds, assets, and
other property which may be subject to lawful claims of custom-
ers."43 Such asset orders are also appropriate "to preserve the sta-
tus quo while an investigation is conducted."44
These policies for ensuring the availability of funds to remedy
wrongdoing and preserving the status quo were recognized by the
Supreme Court as sufficient justification for ex parte asset preser-
vation orders in Coffin Brothers & Co. v. Bennett.45
More recent Supreme Court decisions have recognized the con-
tinuing validity of Coffin Brothers.46 In Sniadach v. Family Fi-
39 See Parker v. Ryan, 959 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1992); Spiegel, 946 F.2d at 1435.
40 See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (adoption decree found unconstitu-
tional because divorced father was not notified of proceedings and not given opportunity to
be heard); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (constructive notice may be given
those beyond reach of process); see also Acorn Ponds v. North Hills, 623 F. Supp. 688, 693
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (claim of deprivation of property without due process of law arising from
denial of future expectation of property right denied).
41 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (termination of social security benefits)
(emphasis added); see also Wolff v. McDonnel, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974) (civil rights
action challenging administrative procedures at Nebraska correctional facility); Committee
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) ("there is a basic right to be heard ... even if it
involves stigma and hardship of a criminal conviction").
42 See 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(1) (1992).
43 H.R. REP. No. 565, 97th Cong., 2d sess., pt. 1, at 93 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3871, 3942.
44 CFTC v. Morris, Harris & Scott, Ltd., 484 F. Supp. 669, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (alleging
sale of commodity options in violation of Commodity Exchange Act); see also SEC v. Manor
Nursing, 458 F.2d 1082, 1106 (2d Cir. 1972) (complainant alleged violations of antifraud
provisions of Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
45 277 U.S. 29, 30 (1928) (upheld validity of ex parte execution order against sharehold-
ers of failed bank and issued order to ensure depositors paid in full).
46 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1973); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337, 339 (1969); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110-12 (1921).
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nance Corp., the Supreme Court explained that Coffin Brothers
was a "situation requiring special protection to a state ... inter-
est."47 That same "situation" exists here. An immensely impor-
tant federal interest is at stake. Depositors, the group protected
in Coffin Brothers, are now protected by federal insurance. The
insurers-federal taxpayers-are at great risk because of wrong-
doing at troubled and failed thrift institutions. It is wholly appro-
priate that those against whom there is prima facie evidence of
unlawful conduct be subject to restraints on their ability to dissi-
pate their assets during the pendency of an enforcement proceed-
ing. An asset preservation order is an essential mechanism for
making certain the assets do not disappear while their true own-
ership is being finally adjudicated.
The federal courts of appeal have invoked the same principle of
protecting federally-insured entities in upholding the constitu-
tionality of unilateral orders under the Multi-employer Pension
Plan Amendments Act of 1980 ("MPPAA"). These decisions in-
volve a mechanism designed to minimize the risk of loss to a fed-
eral government insurer, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora-
tion ("PBGC"). The PBGC is "modeled after the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation."48
The MPPAA cases deal with a provision of the 1980 amend-
ments to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ER-
ISA"). Under the MPPAA, an employer who withdraws from a
multiemployer pension fund (such as a Teamster or Machinist
Union fund) is required to pay "withdrawal liability" to the fund if
the fund is underfunded. Whether a fund is underfunded is a
complex calculation involving the comparison of the fund's assets
with the present value of the pension benefits owed to participants
who have vested in the fund.
Under the procedures established in MPPAA, the pension fund
makes a unilateral determination of whether it is underfunded. If
the fund decides that it is underfunded, it sends a withdrawn em-
ployer an assessment of its liability. ERISA requires the employer
to pay that assessment (usually in installments) within sixty
days.4 9 The employer does not have the opportunity to litigate the
47 Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 339.
48 Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 636 (1990).
49 See 29 U.S.C. § 1399(cX2) (1988); see also Retirement Fund v. Lazar-Wisotzky, 550 F.
Supp. 35, 35 (action to recover withdrawal liability).
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validity of the assessment before paying. The employer does have
the right to arbitrate the claim, but must begin to pay the assess-
ment and continue paying while arbitration proceeds, regardless
of whether the assessment is justified. The unilateral demand of
the pension fund, without review by any government agency or
any judge or other neutral party, forces the employer to pay
amounts that are significant, often millions of dollars. This provi-
sion was adopted to implement Congressional intent "to protect
the funding base" of pension plans and to guard against "with-
drawals [that] will lead to plan failures with unnecessary losses
for participants and the PBGC."50
While employers have challenged the constitutionality of the
"pay now, litigate later" requirement of MPPAA, the courts have
repeatedly sustained the constitutionality of this part of MP-
PAA.5 1 As one district court has explained, the MPPAA payment
provision is designed to shift the burden of withdrawal from the
affected pension plan to the withdrawing employer.2
The OTS asset preservation order achieves essentially the same
result. The affected savings association and its depositors and in-
surer should not have to bear the costs of wrongdoing when there
is prima facie evidence against the perpetrator. To foreclose the
possibility that the respondent in a regulatory enforcement pro-
ceeding may dissipate assets prior to a final order, and thus viti-
ate the effect of such an order, OTS may issue a temporary order
preserving the assets. The agency does not gain control of the as-
sets, and the respondent is not finally deprived of them.
In the Spiegel case, the court of appeals, when applying the
Fuentes test, held that "'[a]n important government interest, ac-
companied by a substantial assurance that the deprivation is not
baseless or unwarranted, may in limited cases demanding prompt
action justify postponing the opportunity to be heard until after
50 H.R. REP. No. 869, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 73 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2918, 2941.
51 See Board of Trustees v. Thompson Building Materials, Inc., 749 F.2d 1396, 1404 (9th
Cir. 1984) (no deprivation of property because of several opportunities to be heard), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985); Textile Workers Pension Fund v. Standard Dye & Finishing
Co., 725 F.2d 843, 854 (2d Cir.) (Pension Plan Trust Fund brought action to recover against
employer who withdrew from plan), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1259 (1984); Republic Industries,
Inc. v. Teamsters Joint Council No. 83 of Virginia Pension Fund, 718 F.2d 628, 641-42 (4th
Cir. 1984) (suit by employer against pension fund alleging MPPA unconstitutional).
52 See Dorn's Transportation, Inc. v. LAM National Pension Fund, 578 F. Supp. 1222,
1232 (D.D.C. 1984), affd, 753 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (noting that liability was assessed
based upon congressionally prescribed methods, not merely upon allegations of fact).
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the initial deprivation.'" 53 The vital governmental interest in min-
imizing the cost of resolving the savings and loan crisis, together
with the prerequisite prima facie case, justify the OTS asset
orders.
IV. CHALLENGES TO ASSET PRESERVATION ORDERS
OTS asset preservation orders have come under attack recently,
largely as a result of the publicity surrounding the notice of
charges and temporary cease and desist order issued with respect
to the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler
("Kaye, Scholer"). The notice of alleged misrepresentations and
material omissions made to the regulators and other alleged viola-
tions of law and professional rules by the firm were in connection
with its representation of Lincoln Savings.
The temporary cease and desist order in that case was crafted to
strike a careful balance between the interests of the respondent
and the interests of the taxpayers. The order preserved the finan-
cial status quo by permitting the firm to continue its normal fi-
nancial life while requiring the firm to give OTS advance notice of
any unusual financial or organizational changes. The firm's obli-
gations to banks and creditors (including its own clerical staff and
associates), all operating expenses, its client accounts, its capital
transactions under $50,000, and most partner compensation were
explicitly included as approved firm expenditures.54
The firm was directed to establish an escrow account consisting
of a percentage of the distributable earnings of those partners who
would have had to shoulder joint and several liability for any po-
tential judgment.5 5 The percentage to be placed in escrow was
twenty-five percent for all partners other than the three named
individually in the notice of charges. This requirement conforms
with the common law firm practice of holding back twenty to
twenty-five percent or more of partners' earnings until at least
53 Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting FDIC v. Mallen, 486
U.S. 230, 240 (1988)). The court applied the following Fuentes test for extraordinary situa-
tions: (1) seizure must be directly necessary to secure important government interest; (2)
there must be a special need for prompt action; and (3) the State must have kept strict
control over the monopoly of legitimate force. Id.
54 See Fishbein, OTS AP No. 92-20, 14.a (Mar. 1, 1992).
55 See id. 14.b(iii); see also Bettina Lawton Alexander, Protecting Yourself and Your
Firm in the Representation of Insured Depository Institutions: Lessons to be Learned from
the Kaye, Scholer Case, 873 A.L.I.-A.BA. 299, 299 (1993).
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year-end.
The purpose of the temporary order was to preserve Kaye,
Scholer's assets in the event of any dissolution, but not to coerce a
settlement. All available evidence demonstrates that the order
had no coercive effect. In May 1992, at a public forum in Chicago,
the lead attorney for Kaye, Scholer in the OTS proceeding ac-
knowledged that the temporary order had been "irrelevant" to the
firm's decision to settle. What appears to have prompted settle-
ment was the concern expressed by Kaye, Scholer's bank lenders
about the merits of the notice of charges and the firm's ultimate
liability. 56
The facts of the Kaye, Scholer case, and the limited reach of the
temporary cease and desist order and its modest practical impact,
have not deterred others from broad and misplaced criticisms of
the banking agencies' asset preservation power. The Association
of the Bar of the City of New York produced a report (the "City Bar
Report") asserting that "the Government may use the coercive
power of a freeze order to obtain an unfair advantage."" More re-
cently, the Working Group on Lawyers' Representation of Regu-
lated Clients of the American Bar Association has stated that it
"shares much of the concern expressed" by that Association re-
garding the coercive power of a freeze order. Although the ABA
Working Group differs in other respects,58 both reports recom-
mend that asset preservation orders should be available only
through the judicial process and that a higher burden of proof
should be required. The reports differ on the precise elements of
that burden. Both the ABA Report and the City Bar Report recom-
56 See Amy Stevens & Paulette Thomas, Legal Crisis: How a Big Law Firm Was Brought
to its Knees by Zealous Regulators, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 1992, at Al; see also OTS v. Kaye,
Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, Misc. No 92-101 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Symposium, Lawyers
at Risk: Lawyer Asset Freezes and Other Chilling Experiences, 12 REv. LITIG. 573 (1993).
57 Daniel J. Capra, Attachment of Law Firm Assets by Federal Regulatory Agencies: A
Report of the Committee on Professional Responsibility of the Bar of the City of New York,
WALL. ST. J., Mar. 13, 1992, at 10 [hereinafter City Bar Report]; Boberski v. Ryan, 793 F.
Supp. 170, 172 (N.D. IM. 1992) (discussing four element test used to establish prima facie
case supporting justification of suspension order).
58 See AmzemcAN BAR ASSOCiATION WoRKING GROUP ON LAWYERS' REPRESENTATION OF
REGULATED CLIENTS, LABORERS IN DIFFERENT VINEYARDS? THE BANKING REGULATORS AND
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 105 (1993) [hereinafter ABA DiscussION DRAFT]. The ABA Working
Group since has issued a final report and recommendations to the House of Delegates. The
recommendations were approved in August 1993; cf Spiegel v. Ryan, 946 F.2d 1435, 1438-
39 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that OTS's temporary order did not amount to improper depri-
vation of property because contemplated seizure was one of few limited in which Supreme
Court allowed an outright seizure without opportunity for proper hearing).
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mend that the federal banking agencies exempt law firms from
asset preservation orders.
The recommendations of the ABA Working Group and the City
Bar Association are unwise as they are based on flawed analysis
of the statutes and the Constitution. Specifically, we would like to
address three points raised by the ABA Working Group pertinent
to asset preservation authority: the function of a prior judicial
hearing; the burden of proof, and whether lawyers are entitled to
special treatment.
A. Judicial Review
Section 8(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act authorizes a
thrift or banking agency to issue an asset preservation order after
making certain determinations. The affected party then may seek
judicial review within ten days. The opposition to this approach
rests on the rationale that "the combination of the notice of
charges and the immediate impact of the temporary order carries
the danger that a respondent might be coerced to settle against
his or her interests and in violation of his or her (often untested)
legal rights."5 9 The ABA Working Group also contends that ex-
isting judicial review is inadequate and that there is an inherent
bias in favor of asset preservation orders. Each of these three ar-
guments is either unsubstantiated or incorrect. The current ap-
proach to asset preservation orders preserves assets for ultimate
judgments while permitting respondents to live normal lives.
First, as to the "coercive" effect of an asset preservation order,
the only factual basis that the ABA Working Group relies on for
its assertion of coercion is the ex post rationalization of Kaye,
Scholer's defense counsel that the asset preservation order was
59 ABA DISCUSSION DRA'r, supra note 58, at 105-06; see also City Bar Report, supra note
57, at 10; see also ABA DIscussIoN DsRemt, supra note 58, at 106. The ABA Working Group
recommended:
[Almending subsections 8(b) and (c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(b) and (c), to clarify that the federal banking agencies (i.e., the Office of Thrift
Supervision, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration, and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), when taking action
against individuals affiliated with insured depository institutions (as opposed to the
institutions themselves), are authorized to obtain asset preservation orders only
through judicial proceedings under § 8(i)(4) of the Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(4).
Id.; cf Spiegel, 946 F.2d at 1441 (holding that: (1) the seizure must be necessary to secure
an important government or public interest; (2) under standards of narrowly drawn stat-
ute, there must be a finding that seizure is necessary and justifiable in a particular in-
stance; and (3) there must be need for prompt action).
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one factor-together with severity of the charges and the size of
the claim-that induced the firm to settle.6 ° The ABA Working
Group recounts no other complaints that an OTS asset order has
coerced a settlement. No such complaints exist because the stan-
dard provisions of an asset preservation order are designed to per-
mit a respondent to continue to lead a reasonably normal life.
They do not strip a respondent of access to all assets.
The ABA Working Group's second argument, that judicial re-
view is insufficient, is essentially a restatement of its first argu-
ment on the assertedly coercive effect of asset preservation orders.
It is this so-called coercion that is "[t]he heart of the objection" to
lack of prior judicial review of the Kaye, Scholer order.6 There is
no substantiated factual basis for this contention. Any respondent
may seek immediate judicial review of an asset preservation or-
der.2 In Kaye, Scholer, the firm unilaterally and voluntarily
waived the available judicial review process. Within four days of
the issuance of the asset preservation order in that case, the firm
had prepared papers and scheduled a hearing in district court but
then (for reasons unknown to OTS) declined to proceed with the
hearing.63 These events occurred three days before the firm
agreed to settle.
The potential disadvantages to a respondent under the current
asset preservation procedures are remote for several reasons.
First, the asset preservation order typically prevents a respondent
only from undertaking certain actions involving his or her assets.
The agency does not gain possession of or title to the assets. Sec-
60 See ABA DIScussION DRAr, supra note 58, at 106 n.296. The same counsel stated at a
public forum in Chicago, in May 1992, that the asset preservation order was "irrelevant" to
the firm's decision to settle. The ABA Working Group does not challenge the accuracy of
this report of what was said in Chicago, and it relies on a later private discussion with this
counsel. Id.; cf Landmark Land Co., Inc. v. OTS, 990 F.2d 807, 810 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding
that preliminary injunction may be obtained after a showing that there is: (1) a substantial
likelihood of success on the merits; (2) substantial threat of irreparable harm; (3)
threatened injury exceeds harm that would flow from the injunction; and (4) injunction
would not undermine public interest).
61 ABA DISCUSSION DRAFr, supra note 58, at 105.
62 See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(2) (1992); see also Landmark Land Co. v. OTS, 990 F.2d 807,
810 (5th Cir. 1993) (party may file application for temporary restraining order); Parker v.
Ryan, 959 F.2d 579, 581-82 (5th Cir. 1992) (temporary cease and desist order may be en-
tered without hearing and may require affirmative action).
63 See Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, Misc. No. 92-101 (D.C. Cir. 1992). The
day after the asset preservation order issued, the firm approached OTS about modifying
the order. The agency asked the firm to submit any comment or request in writing, but the
firm never did so. In other cases, OTS has modified its asset orders, often extensively. See
supra notes 28-38.
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ond, judicial review is available promptly. Third, administrative
remedies under the hardship relief provisions also may be sought.
The difference in the timing of judicial review, therefore, is this:
under the current procedure, the government can preserve assets
immediately and, if an error has been made, a court can correct it
promptly; under the system proposed by the ABA Working Group,
a respondent receives advance notice of the government's claims
and has some time period in which to dispose of his or her assets
before a court order issues. If such a disposition occurs, those as-
sets are unlikely ever to be recovered. 4 We think the balance
clearly weighs in favor of agency-issued asset preservation orders.
Fourth, the ABA Working Group argues that the issuance of as-
set preservation orders, at least by the single-person heads of fed-
eral banking agencies (OTS and OCC), "might well run afoul of
the impartiality requirement of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment."6 5
By statute, OTS may issue an asset preservation order only af-
ter the Director "determines" that the respondent is "likely... to
cause significant dissipation of assets."66 Like all agency determi-
nations, this determination must be made on the record, with the
considered judgment of the Director.
This procedure is in accord with due process jurisprudence.
"The contention that the combination of investigative and adjudi-
cative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of
bias"-essentially the point the ABA Working Group advances-
must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in
64 OTS has had to act promptly. See Wurzelbacher, OTS AP No. 92-70, 9 8 (July 17,
1992) (order) (imminent transfer of $300,00); Spiegel, OTS AP No. 91-31, 1 6 (Mar. 31,
1992) (order) (below-market sale of property to family member); Kielty, OTS AP No. 92-
100, 11 12-13 (Sept. 22, 1992) (order). In Kielty, the principal asset was up for sale, prior
dissipation of $93,000. Id. OTS based an original asset preservation order in part on the
respondent's history of travel overseas and transactions with foreign banks. See Paul, OTS
AP No. 97-50, 919 16-17 (Aug. 29, 1991) (order); Paul, OTS AP No. 90-1873, 1 16 (Oct. 22,
1990) (order). As alleged in the notice of assessment of civil money penalties against Paul,
on receiving notice of the notice of charges and asset preservation order, he immediately
transferred $200,000 overseas and $50,000 to a law firm.
65 ABA DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 58, at 106. The ABA Working Group suggests that
there may be "a difference in the degree of independence from Administration policy exper-
ienced by each [banking] agency" since OTS and OCC are part of the Treasury Department,
and the FDIC and the Federal Reserve are not. Id. at 70. The Secretary of the Treasury
may not intervene in particular OTS enforcement cases. See also 12 U.S.C. § 1462a(b)(3)
(1992); 31 U.S.C. § 321(c)(2)-(3X1992) (powers of Comptroller and Director of OTS not
vested in Secretary).
66 12 U.S.C. 1818(cX1) (1992).
1993]
420 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 8:405
those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that,
under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and
human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative
powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual
bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the
guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented.6 7
The ABA Working Group does not appear to question the hon-
esty and integrity of the Director of OTS (or the head of any bank-
ing agency), nor is there any inherent bias in a section 1818 proce-
dure. OTS has no interest in the assets preserved .6 Any monetary
relief must be paid to the institution affected or its insurer, or, if
in the form of civil money penalties, to the United States Treas-
ury. Thus there is no built-in-bias in OTS's attempt to seek to
preserve assets.
No court has ever questioned the independence of the Director's
decision making on these matters. As discussed above, two-thirds
(fifteen) of the comprehensive asset orders have been challenged
in court. In all of these cases, the court has upheld or followed the
agency's exercise of its discretion.
The ABA Working Group also argues that because the tempo-
rary receiver provision permits the banking agencies to seek as-
set orders in court, it must be that Congress somehow intended to
limit or repeal section 1818(c). 70 This argument overlooks the fact
67 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
68 This separates § 1818 cases from the ones in which the decision-maker has an interest
in a particular outcome. In such cases, the Supreme Court has invalidated the decision-
making procedure. See Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972) (mayor may not ad-
judge traffic offenses when village depends on revenues generated by traffic fines); Tumey
v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) (mayor may not try offenses when compensation of
mayor's services depends on conviction of defendants).
"[T]he test is whether the... situation is one 'which would offer a possible temptation to
the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant,
or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between the State and
the accused.'" Ward, 409 U.S. at 60 (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532).69 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(4) (1992).
70 See ABA DISCUSSION DRAFr, supra note 58, at 75-76. The Working Group apparently
has abandoned the argument in its Discussion Draft that the temporary receiver provisions
for the FDIC and RTC § 1821(d)(18)-(19), cover failed institutions, and so preclude asset
orders involving these institutions. Id. Section 1821(dX18)-(19), say nothing about sup-
planting section 1818 (c)(1), and it would be inconsistent with the comprehensive enforce-
ment scheme that Congress has envisioned for these provisions to do so. Section
1821(d)(18)-(19) cover only civil court actions that the FDIC and RTC may bring. Thus
asset preservation orders would become unavailable in OTS's regulatory enforcement ac-
tions for civil money penalties and other monetary relief that involve failed institutions. We
do not believe Congress intended that certain classes of respondents or certain types of
claims be completely exempt from asset preservation orders by the regulator.
The Working Group also refers to, but correctly appears to reject, the contention that
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that Congress quite clearly intended that the banking agencies
have the power to preserve the respondents' assets v.7  The 1990
amendment to section 1818(c) was specifically designed to over-
rule the district court decision in Spiegel and to clarify that the
agencies do have this power.7 2 Section 1818(i)(4) is simply an al-
ternative mechanism.73 In some cases, the OTS enforcement staff
has determined that section 1818(i)(4) is preferable.
B. Burden of Proof
In order to issue a temporary cease and desist order, a thrift or
banking agency must determine that:
[T]he violation or threatened violation or the unsafe or un-
sound practice or practices, specified in the notice of charges
.. or the continuation thereof, is likely to cause insolvency or
significant dissipation of assets or earnings of the depository
institution, or is likely to weaken the condition of the deposi-
tory institution or otherwise prejudice the interests of deposi-
tors prior to the completion of the proceedings.74
The ABA Working Group argues that this standard needs to be
asset preservation orders are unavailable in cases of failed institutions because in such
cases there are no depositors to be prejudiced. See ABA DIscussIoN DRAFT, supra note 58,
at 90-91. This argument erroneously ignores the fact that the insurance funds are subro-
gated to the interests of depositors and may also be prejudiced. See Akin v. OTS, 950 F.2d
1180, 1183 (5th Cir. 1992); cf 90 A.L.R. FED. 344 (validity construction and application of
provision of 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c) limiting jurisdiction of courts to enjoin enforcement of, or
otherwise affect, federal banking agency's cease and desist orders direct at bank).
71 See 136 CONG. REC. E3691 (daily ed. Nov. 2, 1990) (statement of Representative
Charles E. Schumer) ("[tihe Congress intended in section 902(a)(2) of the Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act to authorize temporary C&D orders to cor-
rect conditions by stating affirmative actions, including making restitution or providing
reimbursement, restricting growth, and other actions which are specifically listed"); see
also Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 302 (1981) (ac-
knowledging that summary administrative action may be justified in emergency situation).
72 See 136 CONG. REC. S17599 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Donald Riegle);
see also Paul v. OTS, 763 F. Supp. 568, 571 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (where OTS order restrains
chief of bank from dissipating assets, it is justified by statutory scheme for dealing with
emergency of bank failures and does not deprive defendant of due process).
73 The Working Group recites with apparent approval a comment to the effect that the
Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act also evidence a congressional intent that § 1818(c)
does not permit asset preservation orders. See ABA DISCUSSION DRAFr, supra note 58, app.
at 2. This Act applies only to certain debts owing to the United States. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 3002(3) (1992). Because the monetary relief OTS seeks is paid to a saving association or
the insurance fund, the Act does not apply. See Lang v. Ryan, 789 F. Supp. 744, 745 (N.D.
Miss. 1991) (holding that the court's jurisdiction over request for stay is precluded by 12
U.S.C. § 1818(i)).
74 12 U.S.C. § 1818(c)(1) (1992); see also Hoffman v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 912 F.2d
1172, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 1990) (temporary cease and desist order may be entered without
hearing and may require affirmative action).
422 ST. JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY
revised in order to incorporate a showing that the "person against
whom the order is being sought is likely to dissipate or otherwise
improperly transfer assets of the institution concerned." 75
The ABA Working Group indicated that the proposed burden of
proof is intended to incorporate two pieces of evidence: "particular-
ized facts indicating that the order is necessary to prevent IAP
(institution-affiliated party) from transferring or dissipating the
assets sought for recovery in the principal enforcement action";
and a showing "that the terms of the freeze order are limited to
conditions necessary to remedy the risk of transfer or dissipation
that gave rise to the order."76
The ABA Working Group apparently intends to emphasize that
"the court has a duty to ensure that the asset preservation order is
properly tailored to the risk of dissipation involved."77 The Work-
ing Group does not specify a particular burden of proof here;
rather, the court must "weigh various factors, including possible
harm to both the IAP and the public, the degree of urgency in-
volved, and the burden of any affirmative action sought from the
defendant."78
It is difficult to predict when the proposal would differ from the
existing "likely... to cause significant dissipation" standard in
section 1818(c)(1), but we foresee some troubling issues. If the
standard of "necessary to prevent" transfer or dissipation requires
proof that in the absence of the order, the respondent certainly
will transfer assets, the practical effect would be to provide each
respondent with at least one free opportunity to transfer his or her
assets before the agency establishes the required proof.79 If the
term "necessary to remedy the risk of transfer or dissipation" re-
quires the agency to show that specific assets or dollar amounts
75 The ABA recommends:
[Almending section 8(i)(4)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(4XB), to require the federal banking
agencies, when seeking an asset preservation order under section 8(i)(4), to demon-
strate that the person against whom the order is being sought is likely to dissipate or
otherwise improperly transfer assets of the institution concerned. Recommendation
No. 2.
This recommendation is premised on the authority to issue asset preservation orders
being assigned exclusively to the courts. We do not believe, as discussed above, that there is
any basis for taking away the agencies' ability to preserve assets through their own orders.
76 ABA DIscussIoN DRAFr, supra note 58, at 109-10.
77 Id. at 111.
78 Id.
79 Of course, if the agency then must apply to a court for an asset preservation order, the
respondent will have multiple opportunities before the hearing to move his assets beyond
the regulatory agencies' reach. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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are likely to be transferred, the effect would severely hamstring
the agency. OTS asset orders are based on evidence of a respon-
dent's proclivity to transfer assets, but the specific account to be
transferred rarely is provable.
The case law cited by the ABA Working Group8 ° fails to support
the notion that an agency is or should be required to demonstrate
the "need" for an order. The Working Group concludes that when
the court in CFTC v. Muller8l said that "[a] prima facie case of
illegality is sufficient," it meant that a showing of need also is re-
quired.8 2 Muller says nothing to that effect."3 Rather, in address-
ing Muller's argument that the CFTC was required to prove, as
part of its case for an asset preservation order, the likelihood of
future violations, the court said that such evidence "might be nec-
essary" if the CFTC had sought to enjoin future violations of the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission Act.8 4 The only reser-
vation expressed in Muller concerning the burden of proof related
to a hypothetical circumstance where the underlying wrongdoing
is solely prospective. OTS's asset orders, by contrast, have been
based solely on past misconduct and have sought to preserve as-
sets in order to remedy the harm caused by that misconduct.
In OTS v. Lopez, 5 another case cited by the ABA Working
Group, the court discussed the equitable discretion inherent in
construction of "shall."8 6 The court "f[ou]nd that while district
courts retain discretion to order prejudgment attachment of assets
on a prima facie showing of illegality, such orders should ordina-
rily ensue upon such a showing." 7 The Eleventh Circuit's con-
struction of "shall" is correct. If this is what the ABA Working
Group understands as "need," then the recommendation is un-
remarkable, but the tone of the ABA Report and the Discussion
80 ABA DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 58, at 66-68; see also OTS v. Lopez, 960 F.2d 958,
961 (11th Cir. 1992) (Bank Fraud Act authorizes district courts to grant OTS's request for
injunctions upon showing of prima facie illegality); CFTC v. Muller, 570 F.2d 1296, 1300
(5th Cir. 1978) (noting that in an action for preliminary injunction agency need not prove
irreparable harm or inadequacy of other remedies, but rather need only establish prima
facie case of illegality).
81 570 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1978).
82 See ABA DIscussIoN DRAFT, supra note 58, at 66.
83 See also Parker v. Ryan, 760 F. Supp. 1189 (N.D. Miss. 1991) (regulatory agency need
not prove irreparable injury or inadequacy of other remedies, need only demonstrate prima
facie illegality).
84 See Muller, 570 F.2d at 1300 (emphasis added).
85 960 F.2d 958 (11th Cir. 1992).
86 Lopez, 960 F.2d at 961 n.8.
87 Id.
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Draft suggests something more is intended. If so, the case law
does not support it.
The Working Group also contends that its proposed standard of
proof would be consistent both with the standards of proof applica-
ble to the FDIC and RTC as conservator or receiver and with con-
gressional intent.8" Neither proposition is correct. The FDIC or
RTC as conservator or receiver may obtain an asset preservation
order in court upon a showing of the elements necessary for a pre-
liminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure-except that neither agency is required to show "that
the injury, loss, or damage is irreparable and immediate."8 9 The
statute granting the FDIC and RTC authority to seek asset pres-
ervation orders thus excludes the showing of dissipation that the
Working Group proposes.
Nor is there any basis for supposing that congressional intent
favors this change in the law. The best evidence of congressional
intent is the statute currently on the books, and it sets forth a
different standard of proof.90
C. Special Treatment for Lawyers
The ABA Working Group has argued that, in addition to legisla-
tive changes, the federal banking agencies should exercise their
discretion and accord special treatment to lawyers when consider-
ing asset preservation orders.9' The Working Group characterizes
their plea for forbearance as "so important that it should be the
subject of an independent resolution."92
It is not clear what the statutory basis is for special treatment
for lawyers. If the banking agencies should accord special treat-
ment to lawyers in the agencies' enforcement actions, then it
would be necessary to amend the enforcement statutes. However,
88 See ABA DISCUSSION DRAFT, supra note 58, at 112.
89 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(19)(A) (1992).
90 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(c)(1), (i)(4) (1992).
91 The ABA Working Group specifically recommended that the federal banking agencies
promote the effective representation of parties before them and minimize the chilling effect
on the attorney-client relationship that results from the fear of agency retaliation. More
particularly, the ABA Working Group suggests adopting an affirmative policy not to use
asset preservation orders against lawyers on account of lawyer conduct in representing
their clients before the agencies, except in the extraordinary circumstance where an asset
preservation order is the only method available to prevent dissipation of assets of an in-
sured depository institution.
92 See supra note 58.
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the Working Group has chosen not to recommend asking Congress
to embrace this request for special handling.
OTS has not taken a different approach to lawyers in its en-
forcement actions than it has to any other group of respondents,
and there is no reason to adopt a special policy for lawyers on the
matter of asset preservation orders. Certainly there is no evi-
dence that OTS has singled out lawyers; only one of the twenty-
two comprehensive asset preservation orders was entered in an
action against lawyers. The agency does, of course, weigh all the
circumstances in each case before deciding whether an asset pres-
ervation order is appropriate. In the one case where such an order
was entered, individual lawyers had refused to supply information
relating to their financial conditions, and the agency had evidence
that the firm planned to reduce its insurance coverage. In this
circumstance, these facts justified an asset preservation order.
The City Bar Report asserts that law firms are fragile and an
asset preservation order can hurt a law firm's relationship with its
lenders even more than the underlying suit.9 3 The City Bar Report
alleges that both the attorney client privilege and zealous advo-
cacy are threatened by an asset preservation order's severe ef-
fects.94 No substantiation is offered for these assertions. The ABA
Report does not attempt to assert them.
The argument that an asset preservation order is more damag-
ing to a firm's relationship with its creditors than a notice of
charges alone is difficult to believe, and is contrary to the facts of
the Kaye, Scholer case, where the firm's lenders were concerned
about the size of the ultimate judgment. The City Bar Report's
other arguments concerning the attorney client privilege and zeal-
ous advocacy are also unpersuasive. The financial disclosure re-
quired by the Kaye, Scholer order did not remotely touch on the
attorney client relationship. Zealous advocates have no more to
fear from an asset preservation order than from any other action
alleging lawyer misconduct.
CONCLUSION
When the savings and loan crisis became a national concern,
Congress stepped forward and supplied regulators with the neces-
93 See City Bar Report, supra note 57, at 5.
94 Id. at 6-7.
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sary tools to address the problem. One of the primary tools, the
ability of the OTS and other banking agencies to issue temporary
cease and desist orders to prevent the dissipation of assets, was
considered so important that Congress acted not once but twice to
give regulators such authority. The temporary cease and desist
orders are not broad unspecific assertions of government power.
Instead, the temporary orders issued by OTS and upheld by the
federal courts have been carefully crafted documents aimed at se-
curing the funds of alleged wrongdoers while preserving the finan-
cial security of those same wrongdoers. Based on thorough ad-
ministrative procedures and subject to immediate judicial
scrutiny, the temporary orders provide excellent means of fairly
preserving the financial status quo and thereby protecting the
taxpayers' interest while the merits of a case are resolved.
The recent publicity surrounding the OTS's use of the asset
preservation powers against a major law firm, Kaye, Scholer,
Fierman, Hays & Handler, only serves to underscore the need for
the authority to act. Some mistakenly believe that the temporary
order only highlighted the underlying enforcement action. The ac-
tion taken by the firm's lenders, by reason of their own assess-
ment of the strength of the underlying suit, appears to have in-
duced the firm to settle quickly. Providing sanctuary for law firms
that allegedly inflicted substantial damage on federally insured
institutions would only impair the efforts of the federal banking
agencies to recover taxpayer funds by creating a doctrine that es-
tablishes lawyers as a sacrosanct class, immune from the reme-
dies available against others charged with complicity in causing
great losses to the citizens of the Nation. Nothing in the nature of
the role of a lawyer or the extent or use of the cease and desist
authority by OTS justifies such a change.
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